Master Plan for a Democratic Burma

Amongst possible reasons, here are three :–

• A majority of Burmans felt it their historic right to dominate non-Burman neighbours, and the latter were showing increasing signs of restiveness at being dominated. The Army was seen to be the way to bring about “the unity of the nation”, a unity which, in so far as it ever existed, had already been damaged by the martial law imposed in some regions during the time of civilian rule. The democratic government, probably reflecting popular opinion, had sought military “win-lose” solutions for political problems.
  
  
• A communist insurgency was still active in parts of the country and this may have been seen as a foreign intervention requiring emergency measures. Chinese immigrants were often prominent in communist movements in S.E. Asian countries such as Thailand, while in Malaya the communist insurgents were almost exclusively Chinese.
  
  
• Parliamentary democracy failed to deliver the golden age expected after Independence. Despite a well-fed population—generally better fed than the people of Britain in the early post-War years—those with political strings to pull could amass great wealth that others could not. It was felt that the Army, with socialist-leaning officers in charge, would “clean up” the country and ensure a fairer distribution of the national wealth.
  
  

Well, of course, we know what happened, because the results are with the country to this day.

Democracy fails when it doesn't reach the grass-roots.

Democracy

It is inadequate to define democracy merely as a system where people vote every few years for someone to represent their interests in the running of the country. These representatives, professional politicians, may or may not do a good job. But there is much more to democracy than elections and parliament, which are merely the most obvious aspect, the tip of the democratic iceberg.

No democracy functions perfectly. But a properly functioning democracy has a complex structure of organs, bodies and groups which ensure that people's voices are heard, and their rights respected.
Some of these bodies are part of the state apparatus. Courts of justice, free from political interference, are an example. Elected local government at regional and township levels are another.
But most such bodies are independent of the state. Examples are uncensored newspapers and Internet discussion groups. Pressure groups of citizens dedicated to promoting or opposing something are another example. Often these groups have no formal structure, no membership, but are merely people cooperating together in pursuit of a common goal.

It is clear that nothing of this sort exists or can exist in SPDC Burma, or Myanmar.

The military regime has a “Road Map to Democracy”. They are doing quite well with it, considering it is plain farce.

The problem is that the Democracy Movement has nothing to offer in its place.

To tell the truth, there is not yet a Democracy Movement.
No structure. No policy. No movement.
Let us hope this situation will not endure for much longer.

The Democratic Answer

Should the Democracy Movement (when it exists) develop a Road Map to Democracy ?

Most certainly not.
A “Road Map” implies a gradual transition to democracy.
And that can never be.
Its implementation would require the cooperation of the military regime, which is totally opposed to giving up power.
The only changes the regime will accept are cosmetic ones that enable it to rule more comfortably.

What is needed is a Master Plan for a Democratic Burma.
Here there are no concessions to authoritarian rule.

Give the people hope.
People struggle and sacrifice for a clear objective, not for vague proposals and compromises.

But, some will say, how can such a Master Plan for a Democratic Burma be put into practice ?

It can't, yet.
But, intelligently prepared, such a Plan can be the most formidable tool in a tool-kit to be used to undermine the SPDC.

We are talking of a time scale of years. How many years, no one can say.
But we are no longer talking of the “never-never” required by a “Road Map”.

The important point is that when the time is ripe, change must be, and will be, extremely rapid, radical and irreversible.

The undermining of the SPDC is essentially a long-term psychological action to be conducted amongst all socioeconomic groups of Burmese society, including military personnel.
There is much groundwork—or, more precisely, undergroundwork—to prepare for The Big Day.

When the human explosion occurs, the detonator may be some completely unforeseen event of cyclonic proportions, or it might even be a seemingly irrelevant little incident that triggers a chain-reaction.
But large masses of the people, in all walks of life, must be already “psyched up” to brave the risks of open, spontaneous revolt. The revolt must be a conflagration on a scale that is almost impossible to extinguish.

There must exist underground democracy cells whose members, though relatively few in number, have clear knowledge about neutralising resistance and can guide the masses to do what is necessary.

What should be the Master Plan ?

Firstly, discover what the people most earnestly desire.
The Master Plan pledges them that, and explains the mechanisms by which it will implement its promises.
Democracy, in essence, means discovering what people want (security of person and property, a sense of wellbeing, cultural identity, health, education, freedom of expression, improved living conditions) — and providing it.
Everything should be clearly explained. No vague assurances.

Who are “the People” ?
People are not all the same. But they can be categorised, and sub-categorised. The priorities of a small farmer are not necessarily identical to those of an office worker, or a soldier, or a shopkeeper, for example.

The Master Plan for a Democratic Burma must deal with the needs felt by each group — occupational, ethnic, and religious.
And it must go into details of how it will give them what they want.

document here previously